

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR REPAIRING DAMAGE TO A COMPUTER SYSTEM USING A SYSTEM ROLLBACK MECHANISM

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

5

1. Technical Field:

The present invention relates generally to an improved data processing system and in particular to a method and apparatus for managing data within a data processing system. Still more particularly, the present invention provides a method and apparatus for
10 repairing damage caused by an unauthorized intrusion into a data processing system.

2. Description of Related Art:

The Internet, also referred to as an "internetwork", is a set of computer networks, possibly dissimilar, joined together by means of gateways that handle data transfer and the
15 conversion of messages from a protocol of the sending network to a protocol used by the receiving network. When capitalized, the term "Internet" refers to the collection of networks and gateways that use the TCP/IP suite of protocols.

The Internet has become a cultural fixture as a source of both information and entertainment. Many businesses are creating Internet sites as an integral part of their
20 marketing efforts, informing consumers of the products or services offered by the business or providing other information seeking to engender brand loyalty. Many federal, state, and local government agencies are also employing Internet sites for informational purposes, particularly agencies, which must interact with virtually all segments of society such as the Internal Revenue Service and secretaries of state. Providing informational
25 guides and/or searchable databases of online public records may reduce operating costs. Further, the Internet is becoming increasingly popular as a medium for commercial

transactions.

The Internet also is widely used to transfer applications to users using browsers. With respect to commerce on the Web, individual consumers and businesses use the Web to purchase various goods and services. In offering goods and services, some companies offer goods and services solely on the Web while others use the Web to extend their reach.

Further, the Internet has provided a medium for widespread messaging using electronic mail, also referred to as e-mail. With e-mail, a user may send a message to another user quickly over large geographic distances. For example, the sender of an e-mail may be located in New York while the recipient is located in Los Angeles. The transfer of e-mail may take only seconds as compared to days with the use of the post office to send a letter. Thus, more and more messages are being sent by e-mail rather than traditional mail.

With this widespread use of the Internet, threats from unauthorized intrusions, such as viruses, has become more common. A virus is a routine or program that can infect other routines or programs by modifying the target routines or programs, or the environment such that execution of the virus will result in the execution of a possibly modified copy of the virus. For example, if a program containing a virus is executed, the virus code is activated and attaches copies of itself to other programs in the system. Infected programs copy the virus to other programs. The effect of the virus may be a simple prank that pops up a message on screen out of the blue, or it may destroy programs and data right away or on a certain date. For example, a virus may lie dormant and damage a computer system once a year. Computer viruses and similar threats can be detected by matching patterns of known virus behavior in detailed system audit trails. In general, such a system is called an intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS only detects the virus after it has run and infected the system, potentially damaging the system as well. Therefore, it would be advantageous to have an improved method and apparatus for repairing damage caused by an unauthorized intrusion of a data processing system.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

5 The present invention provides for a method and apparatus for protecting data from damage in a data processing system. The data is journaled to form journaled data. A determination is then made as to whether a virus is present in the data processing system after journaling of data has begun. Journaling involves storing a system state before an action is executed so that the state can be restored upon demand. The detection
10 of a virus may be performed by using pattern matching on system audit trails in which the system audit trails contain activities occurring within the data processing system. In response to an identification of the virus, the data is restored to its previous state using the journaled data.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The novel features believed characteristic of the invention are set forth in the
5 appended claims. The invention itself, however, as well as a preferred mode of use,
further objectives and advantages thereof, will best be understood by reference to the
following detailed description of an illustrative embodiment when read in conjunction
with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

Figure 1 is a diagram of a network data processing system in accordance with a
10 preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 2 is a diagram of a data processing system in accordance with a preferred
embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 3 is a block diagram of components used in detecting intrusions and
repairing damage from intrusions in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the
15 present invention;

Figure 4 is a data flow diagram illustrating pattern matching and journaling in
accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 5 is a flowchart of a process used for detecting unauthorized intrusions
and repairing damage from unauthorized intrusions in accordance with a preferred
20 embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 6 is a flowchart of a process used for pattern matching in accordance with
a preferred embodiment of the present invention; and

Figure 7 is a state diagram illustrating identification of unauthorized intrusions in
accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

With reference now to the figures, and in particular to **Figure 1**, a diagram of a
5 network data processing system is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of
the present invention. Network data processing system **100** is a network of computers and
other devices in which the present invention may be implemented. Network data
processing system **100** contains network **102**, which is the medium used to provide
communications links between various devices and computers connected together within
10 network data processing system **100**. Network **102** may include connections, such as wire,
wireless communication links, or fiber optic cables.

In this example, workstation **104** and workstation **106** are data processing systems
connected to network **102**. Additionally, network resource **108** and network resource **110**
are also connected to network **102**. Network resource **108** includes a journaling capability,
15 for example, a remote mountable device hosted on a server with journaling installed. On
the other hand this capability is absent from network resource **110**, for example, a remote
mountable device hosted on a server without journaling installed. Remote mountable
device **112** and remote mountable device **114** are connected to network **102**. Remote
mountable device **112** includes full control while remote mountable device **114** has limited
20 control. A remote mountable device may be, for example, a hard disk drive or a storage
unit in a tape drive system.

The present invention provides a method, apparatus, and computer-implemented
instructions for detecting unauthorized intrusions in a data processing system, such as
workstation **104**, and for repairing damage to the system using a system rollback
25 mechanism. Computer viruses and similar threats can be detected by matching patterns
of known virus behavior in detailed system audit trails. The audit trails contain

sequences of actions or transactions occurring within a data processing system. Pattern matching may be implemented in an intrusion detection system (IDS). The particular type of IDS used in the depicted examples is called a misuse intrusion detection system. The IDS only detects the virus after it has run and infected the system, potentially
 5 damaging the system as well. The present invention combines this IDS system with a journaling system tailored specifically to viruses. Furthermore, other intrusions in addition to those caused by viruses may be handled using the mechanism of the present invention.

In particular, a journaling mechanism is implemented in which the system state of a
 10 data processing system may be saved for use in restoring this state if an unauthorized intrusion is detected. Journaling is the method of saving a system state before transactions are executed so that this state can be restored on demand. Journaling may be applied to different system objects, such as a data file or a program. For example, a file that is being modified or just the part of the file that is being modified may be saved.
 15 This mechanism requires tracking data dependencies when multiple processes modify the same system object. If a rollback to a prior state is required for the modifications performed by one process in the data processing system, the data dependencies indicate whether the rollback can be safely achieved. Tracking the dependencies and storing the journal data is usually very expensive. The mechanism of the present invention optimizes
 20 journaling to minimize resource use when detecting viruses using an IDS, as described in more detail below.

Additionally, the mechanism of the present invention may be used to restore the state of data located externally to a workstation, such as workstation 104. For example, actions may be taken by workstation 104 in which these actions affect data and other
 25 devices or data processing systems. An action may write or modify data in workstation 106 or remote mountable device 112. Data may be journaled within workstation 104 or in

another location, such as network resource **108**, which contains a journaling capability.

In the depicted example, network data processing system **100** is the Internet with network **102** representing a worldwide collection of networks and gateways that use the TCP/IP suite of protocols to communicate with one another. At the heart of the Internet is a backbone of high-speed data communication lines between major nodes or host computers, consisting of thousands of commercial, government, educational and other computer systems that route data and messages. Of course, network data processing system **100** also may be implemented as a number of different types of networks, such as for example, an intranet, a local area network (LAN), or a wide area network (WAN).

Figure 1 is intended as an example, and not as an architectural limitation for the present invention.

Turning next to **Figure 2**, a diagram of a data processing system is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Data processing system **200** may be used to implement a workstation, such as workstation **104** or workstation **106** in **Figure 1**. In this example, central processing unit (CPU) **202** is connected to bus **204**. Bus **204** may be implemented using various bus architectures. One such architecture is a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus system. Also connected to bus **204** is memory **206** and video adapter **208**. Video adapter contains a connection to display devices, such as monitor **210**. Storage device **212** and storage device **214** also are connected to bus **204**. These devices may be, for example, a hard disk drive, a floppy disk drive, or a tape drive. Network adapter **216** is connected to bus **204** and provides a connection to a network, such as network **102** in **Figure 1**.

In this example, memory **206** contains process **218**, sensor **220** and operating system **222**. Typically, access to data on a storage device, such as storage device **212** occurs with process **218** sending a request or command to access data to operating system **222**. In the depicted example, sensor **220** receives the request or command and sends that

request to operating system 222. Sensor 220 contains the processes of the present invention in these examples. In particular, the detection of unauthorized intrusions, journaling of data, and restoring of data are implemented within sensor 220.

As used herein, sensor 220 acts as a system call filter such that selected system
 5 calls cause processes to be redirected to sensor 220 rather than directly to operating system 222. Alternatively, sensor 220 may be built into the kernel of operating system 222 depending on the particular implementation.

Sensor 220 may be implemented in a number of different ways. For example,
 many modern UNIX systems offer one or more of: (1) a system call tracing service (often
 10 called 'strace'); (2) a library call tracing service (often called 'ltrace'); and (3) a kernel call tracing service (often called 'ktrace'). In such an environment, practical implementations of the sensor(s) will probably make use of one or more of these services. However, sensor 220 could be implemented without the assistance of any of the above services. In Microsoft Windows, which is available from Microsoft Corporation, the sensor is
 15 implemented in a similar manner except there is no convenient system-provided tracing service to use. Instead a tracing service is created by redirecting all calls to the file system, and any other part of the operating system that is to be monitored, to the routine of the present invention. This routine records the access data before allowing the request from the process to proceed. The precise method for redirecting the service requests
 20 varies with the version of Windows, but the concept stays the same. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that there may even be multiple methods of redirection with one operating system version, with varying degrees of reliability.

According to the present invention, the method recommended by the operating system vendor is chosen. In UNIX systems where a system-provided tracing service is
 25 not available, a separate sensor is created. This method can, in fact, be used on any type of operating system. In these examples, the implementation is described with respect to a

Windows operating system platform from Microsoft Corporation. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the concepts described herein are applicable to other operating systems and hardware as well.

With reference now to **Figure 3**, a block diagram of components used in detecting intrusions and repairing damage from intrusions is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Sensor **220** includes sensor filter **300**, pattern matcher **302**, and journaler **304**. Sensor filter **300** receives calls from process **218** to access data. Calls are redirected to sensor filter **300** rather than proceeding directly to operating system **222**. Pattern matcher **302** receives a notification of calls made by process **218**. Pattern matcher **302** will return an acknowledgment to sensor filter **300**. Additionally, pattern matcher **302** may send a control signal back to sensor filter **300**, to modify the behavior of the filter, if necessary. The request to access data from process **218** is sent by sensor filter **300** to journaler **304**, which passes this request onto operating system **222**. Data is returned from operating system **222** to process **218** through journaler **304** and sensor filter **300**.

Pattern matcher **302** will send a signal to set a checkpoint to journaler **304**. The checkpoint indicates the point in the journal data at which pattern matching begins by pattern matcher **302**. This checkpoint signal is used by journaler **304** to begin storing data accessed by process **218** as journal data **306**. The journaling functionality implemented in journaler **304** allows sensor **220** to save data being modified by a call from process **218**. Further, pattern matcher **302** also may send signals to external journals **308**, such as network resource **108** in **Figure 1**, to journal data. Pattern matcher **302** will compare sequences of activities, such as requests by process **218**, to patterns **310**. A match with a pattern may identify an occurrence of an unauthorized intrusion. Further, a match also may identify that an absence of an unauthorized intrusion is present.

If an unauthorized intrusion is absent due to a match or due to some amount of

time or number of activities passing by, pattern matcher **302** sends a signal to journaler **304** to purge journal data **306**. Then, another checkpoint is set to begin journaling data. On the other hand, if an unauthorized intrusion is identified, pattern matcher **302** sends a signal to journaler **304** to “rollback” or restore the state of the data using journal data **306**.

5 In addition, pattern matcher **302** will send a signal to operating system **222** to block access or halt execution of process **218**. Similar signals may be sent by pattern matcher **302** to external journals **308** to purge journals or rollback data. Finally, sensor filter **300**, passes the request from process **218** to operating system **222**, receives any responses from operating system **222**, and transfers these back to the process.

10 The journaling functionality in journaler **304** may be implemented in a number of different ways. For example, in one implementation, the data that is being written is cached for process **218** alone, but the original object is left unmodified until the sensor **220** is satisfied that process **218** does not exhibit the virus property. Only then is the data written to the system. Any reads by process **218** to the data are redirected to the cached
15 version of the object. Any access to the object from a different process is blocked until sensor **220** is either satisfied that process **218** is not a virus and process **218** has released the object from use, or determines that the process is a virus, and sensor **220** has restored the object.

The advantage of this implementation is that it avoids the need to maintain a list
20 of dependencies. A different process accessing the object is blocked until the sensor **220** has made its determination as to whether or not process **218** is a virus, and possibly restore the object based upon the results of that determination. Since the time needed to detect the virus is typically short, the blocking should not have much impact unless two processes need to cooperate and the blocking results in a deadlock situation. This method
25 is easiest to implement, but is not optimal for complex systems with a lot of inter-process communication.

In another implementation, when sensor 220 determines that data is about to be overwritten, it saves that data to a protected memory (only accessible to sensor 220) before allowing the write to proceed. Once sensor 220 has decided that process 218 is not viral (that is to say, does not exhibit properties displayed by viruses), then the data stored in the protected memory can be released. In the converse case (i.e. that process 220 exhibits properties displayed by viruses), the data that it overwrote can be restored using the stored copies in the protected memory. Because the sensors are able to detect a virus fairly quickly, the data is not kept very long and the dependency lists are fairly short. In the situation where multiple processes are accessing the same area of data, then sensor 220 will have to preserve multiple, interdependent, copies of the that data, as well as information about which process 218 wrote which data and when the data was written.

The advantage of this second example of journaling is that it avoids blocking other processes. However, that comes at the price of higher overhead. Since the journal data is released quickly, the build up of dependency overhead may peak but is minimal over time.

In another embodiment, whenever data is written to an object, the entire object is saved in protected memory. Dependency tracking is needed as described above, except that at every modification, another copy of the entire object is made. This embodiment is only interesting when accessing the buffers containing the information to be written is difficult. This example is only advantageous if it is easier to access to the system object than to the access system call buffers. Otherwise, it would waste too much space.

The present invention may employ any of these journaling mechanisms and may include other variations not explicitly mentioned. The choice will depend on the capabilities of the operating system on which the sensor is implemented.

Turning next to **Figure 4**, a data flow diagram illustrating pattern matching and journaling is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present

invention. In the depicted examples, pattern matcher **400** may be implemented as pattern matcher **302** in **Figure 3**. In these examples, the data is a set or sequence of actions.

Matching engine **402** compares these actions received from sensor filter **404** to different patterns located within rules repository **406**. The rules define patterns, which are
 5 considered to be associated with a virus being present. Further these rules define patterns, which eliminate the possibility of a virus being present.

Matching engine **402** sends a signal to set a checkpoint in block **408**. This checkpoint is set in journaling system **410** and journaling system **412**. The checkpoint indicates the point at which pattern matching is performed by matching engine **402**.

10 In block **414**, a determination is made as to whether a virus was found. If a virus was found, a rollback is initiated in block **416** to return data back to the state present when the checkpoint was set by matching engine **404**. This rollback or return of data to the previous state is performed by journaling system **410** and journaling system **412** in this example. If an absence of a virus occurs in block **414**, a signal to discard the journal
 15 is made in block **418**, which causes journaling system **410** and journaling system **412** to discard the journaled data stored in these systems.

With reference now to **Figure 5**, a flowchart of a process used for detecting unauthorized intrusions and repairing damage from unauthorized intrusions is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The process illustrated
 20 in **Figure 5** may be implemented in sensor, such as sensor **220** in **Figure 2**.

The flow in this figure begins by waiting for a process to begin (step **500**). In the depicted examples, data is journaled and actions are matched to patterns for a particular process executing on a data processing system. An identification of the process is stored (step **502**). The process ID is used to differentiate this process from others that might be
 25 accessing the same objects. Next, a journal checkpoint is set (step **504**). The journal checkpoint is used to initiate journaling or storing data prior to different actions being

taken by the process. Pattern matching is started (step 506). Pattern matching is used to identify whether a virus is present. This step is described in more detail in **Figure 6** below. A determination is then made as to whether a virus has been found (step 508). The determination in step 508 is based on the results of pattern matching in step 506. If a virus is found, the process is halted (step 510). A rollback or restoration of data is made using the journal (step 512). Access to the offending program is then blocked (step 514) with the process returning to step 500. This blocking of the process or program associated with the process is made to prevent any further damage from occurring. Turning back to step 508, if no virus is found, the journal is discarded (step 516) and the process returns to step 500.

Turning now to **Figure 6**, a flowchart of a process used for pattern matching is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The process illustrated in **Figure 6** is a more detailed description of step 506 in **Figure 5**.

The flow in **Figure 6** begins by recording the time when pattern matching starts (step 600). Next, patterns of activities are matched or compared with a current audit trail history (step 602). The patterns of activities are ones that may be used to positively identify or eliminate a possibility of an unauthorized intrusion. The current audit trail history is a set of actions taken or initiated by the process or program. A determination is then made as to whether a virus has been found (step 604). If a virus is found, the flow terminates. Otherwise, a determination is made as to whether the patterns are exhausted (step 606). In the depicted examples, if all the patterns have been examined, it is assumed that the presence of a virus is not possible with respect to the set of patterns being used for pattern matching.

If the patterns are exhausted, the flow terminates. If the patterns are not exhausted, a determination is made as to whether a time threshold has been reached (step 608). In step 608, if the time threshold is reached and no pattern is matched, it is assumed that no

virus is present because of the lack of activities associated with a virus, and the flow terminates. If a time threshold has not been reached, the process retrieves the next audit record (step 610) with the process returning to step 602. The flow illustrated in **Figure 6** may be applied to unauthorized intrusions other than those caused by viruses. For example, the flow may be applied to identifying hacking or malfunctioning processes.

Turning next to **Figure 7**, a state diagram illustrating an example of identification of unauthorized intrusions is depicted in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The detection of the virus is facilitated by matching sequences of actions recorded by the sensor with predefined patterns. The patterns are modeled on previously known patterns of misuse by computer viruses or other malware. The patterns are chosen to have a very low false positive rate, i.e., there is only minimal chance that the pattern will match benign behavior. Such a misuse pattern can be expressed in a number of possible ways. In a preferred embodiment, the patterns are expressed as rules in a forward chaining language, such as RUSSEL, OPS5 or as a Coloured Petri Net program. Irrespective of the language used, these rules may be illustrated using state-transition diagrams such as in **Figure 7**. These state-transition diagrams are very much like the Coloured Petri Nets that can be used in an implementation of the present invention.

State machine 700 begins in state S0 and if a file is opened (transition t1), state machine 700 moves to state S1 and remains in that state in response to any action except for a read from the beginning of the file (BOF). Upon a read from the BOF (transition t2), state machine 700 shifts to state S2. From state S2, state machine 700 shifts to state S3 in response to a write to end of file (EOF) (transition t3). State machine 700 shifts to state S4 if a write to BOF occurs (transition t4). State machine 700 shifts to state SI if a close file occurs (transition t5). State SI indicates an infected state in this example.

Referring back to state S1, if a read from anywhere but the BOF or a close occurs

(transition **t7**), state machine **700** shifts to state **SU**, which indicates an uninfected state. In state **S2**, state machine **700** shifts to state **SU** in response to a write to anywhere but EOF or a close (transition **t8**). In state **S3**, state machine **700** also shifts to state **SU** in response to a write anywhere but BOF or a close (transition **t9**).

5 Turning back to state **S0**, state machine **700** remains in state **S0** in response to any operation, but a file open (transition **t10**). In state **S1**, state machine **700** remains in this state in response to any operation except a read (transition **t11**). A read to BOF (transition **t2**) places state machine **700** into state **S2**. Any other read (transition **t7**) places state machine **700** into state **SU**. In state **S2**, state machine **700** remains in this state in
10 response to any operation except a write (transition **t12**). A write to EOF (transition **t3**) places state machine **700** into state **S3**. Any other write (transition **t8**) places state machine **700** into state **SU**. Next, in state **S3**, state machine **700** remains in this state in response to any operation but a write (transition **t13**). A write to BOF (transition **t4**) places state machine **700** into state **S4**. Any other write (transition **t9**) places state
15 machine **700** into state **SU**. Turning back to state **S4**, state machine **700** remains in this state in response to any operation (transition **t14**) except a close file (transition **t5**).

 Still with reference to **Figure 7**, a "time to live" value can be associated with the rule, in which the rule must match or the state will automatically change to state **SU**. This mechanism is necessary to avoid rules being orphaned in the pattern matcher and using
20 resources in both the pattern matcher and the journaler. The value is set by the programmer based on knowledge of the type of intrusion. The time can nearly always be kept very low by tuning the patterns and the "time to live" value together as it is not always necessary to detect the entire chain of events that a intrusion produces. Usually, only the infection process itself needs to be detected and this must be kept short by the
25 virus itself to avoid other parts of the system interfering with the intrusion process. The rule matching can also be terminated by the process terminating. This termination can be

specified in the rules. As system misuse is usually instigated by a single process, if a pattern doesn't match by the time the process terminates, the state in the rule can be changed to state **SU**.

The journaling is also driven by these rules. When the file is written to, as in transition **t3** and transition **t4**, the data (if any) that is being overwritten, is stored or the written information is cached, depending on the journaling method used. This is triggered implicitly by the transition, but in an alternative implementation, the caching also may be embedded in the rules themselves. This mechanism may be used to optimize the amount of information that is journaled. In a preferred embodiment, the journaling is performed implicitly to avoid overburdening the rules. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that both and perhaps other implementations have their own advantages and disadvantages.

Other circumstantial information is kept by the journaling system, such as, for example, the name of the program that created the running process. In the case of multiple concurrent threads in a process, these too are be tracked. When the process ends, this information may be discarded.

In these examples, reaching the state **SI** in **Figure 7** triggers the rollback mechanism used to restore the data to a previous state. The program or process application that caused the rule to match is first killed, and then the journal is used to restore infected objects to their original states. The program that created the process is then locked away by whatever means seem fit to prevent it from being run again. This can be done by putting it in a hidden and protected directory, modifying the file's access rights so the user cannot execute the file or modify the rights, or encrypted. Furthermore, the file can be packaged and sent to a Digital Immune System analysis center for further analysis.

Not all system objects are under the control of the CPU on which the detection/rollback system is running. A virus might modify objects outside of the system.

An example of this is a file that another system shares for outside access. This file can be infected or modified by the virus as easily as internal system objects. In some cases, the sensor can be programmed to maintain a local cache of these objects. This is another reason why leaving the original data object unmodified can be advantageous. However, if
5 the caching method is not possible, it might be necessary to cooperate with a rollback system on the remote system.

If a rollback or journaling system is installed on the target machine that is included in a trust relationship with the source machine, this can be used. The journaling system can be of the same type as that described here and included as a complete software
10 package. Alternatively, the journaling system can be a third party product with an interface that can be used. Strong authentication and encryption of the communication between the source and target system would be necessary in a practical implementation, but not a prerequisite to the functioning of the method described here.

Thus, using the mechanisms of the present invention, it is possible to defend a
15 system from malicious code, in particular computer viruses, in a manner that requires less maintenance by the producers of the product and the system administrators when compared to a string-based file scanner, and less intervention by the user when required to clean up his system. This advantage is provided through the patterns used to detect the virus, which are able to detect more viruses with fewer patterns and through removing the
20 damage caused by the infection quickly and transparently before the damage becomes manifest. All this can be achieved with a minimum of overhead, comparable with that of an on-access file scanner.

The present invention employs tight coupling detection and journaling components. The type of threat is arbitrary in such a system, so long as detection patterns
25 can be created that detect the threat in such a way that its affects can be removed by the journaler without requiring large amounts of information to be stored for a long time.

Therefore the mechanism of the present invention works very well for handling viruses on single user machines.

It is important to note that while the present invention has been described in the context of a fully functioning data processing system, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the processes of the present invention are capable of being distributed in the form of a computer readable medium of instructions and a variety of forms and that the present invention applies equally regardless of the particular type of signal bearing media actually used to carry out the distribution. Examples of computer readable media include recordable-type media, such as a floppy disk, a hard disk drive, a RAM, CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs, and transmission-type media, such as digital and analog communications links, wired or wireless communications links using transmission forms, such as, for example, radio frequency and light wave transmissions. The computer readable media may take the form of coded formats that are decoded for actual use in a particular data processing system.

The description of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, and is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the invention in the form disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Although the depicted examples illustrate the handling of viruses, the present invention may be applied to other types of unauthorized intrusions, such as hacking and malfunctioning processes. The embodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention, the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the invention for various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.